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Abstract
This work provides a deeper account of an increasing phenomenon char-
acterising the EU in recent years, namely software patenting. Although
the European patent convention expressively prohibits it, this has not been
a major problem for firms and inventors that have seen their applications
being granted as well. First of all, a new reliable database on European
software patents is presented and its quality carefully checked. According to
that, more than 30 000 software patents have been granted so far to both
European and Non-European companies. Second, we investigate the relevant
factors explaining firm-level software patenting at the EPO. To this respect, a
large part of them has been found to belong to American and Japanese firms.
Moreover, software patents are found to be characterised by an higher average
length of the granting procedure and by the fact that firms belonging to the
software sector do not apply for them. Finally, results from non-linear panel
data estimation reveal that patents are not deemed as useful appropriability
instruments by software firms and that a ’threat effect’ by hardware firms is
growing in importance. This last result is in line with recent developments of
the literature relative to strategic patenting.
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1 Introduction
During the last ten years the number of filed and granted patents at the main
three Patent offices - i.e. United States Patent Office (USPTO), European
Patent Office (EPO) and Japanese Patent Office (JPO) - has increased
spectacularly. This increase has been driven mainly by patent filings in high
tech classes (Hall, 2004). Among these, software patents attract particular
interest mainly because of the nature of the technology and because software
patentability has been, quite recently, at the center of a debate at the
European level.
Since a long time, the economic literature has recognized the importance
of the patent system in shaping and directing the rate of appropriation of
the innovative effort of firms (Arrow, 1962). Besides ‘classical’ contributions,
the literature developed to explain the recent trends in worldwide patenting
has relied on Schumpeter’s contributions to economic thought (Schumpeter,
1942). More recently, evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter, 1982) has
focused on the role of patents in enhancing or hindering innovation depending
on industries where firms compete. Therefore, a number of authors started
to stress that, depending on appropriability conditions of industries, patents
might be, or not, a useful institutional mechanism in order to promote the
variety of technological solutions and the selection by market forces via
competition (Merges and Nelson, 1990).
Hence, on the one side, empirical literature has shown how patents might
not be suitable appropriability mechanisms in a high number of sectors
(Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000), but, on the other side, we have witnessed
an explosion in the number of patents filed in recent years. A set of research
questions arise from these seemingly contradictory patterns of diffusion.
Among the others, why such a trade-off exists and which factors are likely to
explain it at the micro-level.
One major explanation put forward in recent contributions highlights the
role played by the strategic behaviour of firms aimed at hindering competition,
obtaining licensing revenues and increasing their power in negotiations. In
particular, Mazzoleni and Nelson (1998) stressed how in industries where the
innovation process relies mainly on improvements made by others, namely
cumulative system technologies, it is more likely to find strategic patenting
behaviors such as cross-licensing, blocking rivals or extracting licensing
revenues.
Another example of strategic patenting refers to submarine patents that is
a patent issued after an extraordinarily long period of pre-grant review inside
a patent office thus allowing the applicant to reveal it only after that the new
patent covered widely-adopted technologies. In this way the owner of the
original patent could pursue infringement actions, or seek injunction, against
other technology adopters. Graham and Mowery (2004) have investigated
the role of procedural revisions of patent applications (called ‘continuations’)
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in software patents in the United States during 1987–1999. The authors
individuate a rapid growth in the use of continuations between 1987 and
1995 in software patenting.1
The main contribution of the present article is to give an account of this
phenomenon at the EPO in a cumulative system technology such as software.
To do that, first of all a reliable data-set containing software patents is to be
be framed. The main problem is that there’s no one to one correspondence
between software technology and IPC class or sub-class, thus calling for a
tailored methodology in order to identify software patents among general
ones. Before going on with this, we provide a literature background dealing
with the issue of software patents for both US and EU revealing the most
striking results concerning strategic patenting in this area. While for the US
patent system several works have already been presented, the EU has been
mainly disregarded with the exception of a couple of works (see section 2).
Section 3 presents the theoretical model explaining factors affecting software
patenting at the firm level which is going to be tested in the empirical part.
Particular interest will be dedicated to the question of whether strategic
patenting is actually an issue in the EU and whether different behaviours
refer to different industries under scrutiny. An original dataset for the period
2000-03 is put forward in section 4 which links the number of software
patents filed at the EPO with the R&D spending and other relevant variables
related to applicants. Consistency and representability of the database is
also carefully checked compared to other methodologies implemented in the
literature. Econometric analysis is then performed to find out the most
relevant factors affecting software patenting decisions for firms belonging to
different industries (section 4). Finally, results are presented and discussed
(sections 5 and 6).
2 Literature background
Studies dealing with software patents refer primarily to the US patent system
where software is a patentable subject matter since 1981.2 Allison and Lemley
(2000) and Allison and Tiller (2003) are the first to carry out a detailed
analysis of more than 200 software patents defined as such by reading the
description of every single patent. Their main interest lies in the comparison
of internet-related patents and general patents in order to test the general
belief that internet business method patents have not been properly searched
1Year 1995 marked a sharp change in this growth because of changes in the US patent law
aimed at hitting directly this kind of practice. Prior to that, continuation applications were
used more intensively by large packaged-software firm and patents subject to continuation
have been found to be characterised by longer examination delays and to be more valuable.
2see court decision Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
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for relevant prior art, meaning that they are likely to be of poor quality.3
The main conclusion of the study points out that there is little support
for the main criticism given that internet-related patents are found to be
characterised by the same amount of prior art references as more general
patents.
To our knowledge, one of the first general methodology to identify software
patents has been proposed by Graham and Mowery (2003) who examined
all of the patents falling into identified IPC classes defining them software
patents as such.4 Main findings can be summarised as follows: (i) larger and
older firms tend to increase their patent propensities; (ii) large electronic
systems firms are more important than packaged software ones in software
patenting; (iii) the ratio between the number of citations received by patents
owned by the top 100 packaged software firms and the number of citations
of software patents overall is increasing, except for electronic firms; (iv) a
decreasing propensity to copyright software is found, thus pointing to a
substitution effect.
An alternative methodology to identify software patents has been put
forward by Bessen and Hunt (2007), who developed a search algorithm, based
on a fixed number of keywords, in order to find number and characteristics
of software patents accorded by the USPTO during the period 1976-2002. It
comes out that software patents are mainly developed by US inventors and
are owned by US assignees. Moreover, they are more likely to be obtained by
large firms, established firms and firms in manufacturing. The authors then
put forward an econometric model to test which factors contribute to explain
the rising propensity to patent software in the sample. They find evidence
that capital intensive firms tend to patent more because of threat of hold–up
by rivals. Furthermore, industries with a high propensity to patent are also
those characterised by a high patent propensity in general. Overall, the rising
patent propensity is not explained by any of the controls thus leading the
authors to conclude that this is caused by legal changes occurred in the 80s
when cost-effectiveness of software patents has been reduced considerably. 5
In line with the previous study, Chabchoub and Niosi (2005) adopt a
keyword method to identify software patents and combine this information
with company data from other sources. Then, they concentrate on factors
affecting the propensity to patent software by American and Canadian firms
during the period 1986-2002. Results from the study show that firms which
3The rationale is that software development has been taking place for a long period
before software was deemed patentable, so that when USPTO begin to issue patents of
this kind they did have neither examiners with the relevant training nor adequate database
with software prior art.
4These IPC classes were individuated by analysing overall patenting by the six largest
US producers of personal computer software based on their 1997 calendar revenues.
5In particular, the authors claim that the formation of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit in 1982 lowered standards of patentability allowing the rights of patent
holders to be more easily enforced in court.
4
This is the author’s post-print copy of the article published as: 
Sources and characteristics of software patents in the European Union: some empirical considerations. 
Information Economics and Policy, 23(1), pp. 141-157, 2011. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2010.12.002 
are more likely to patent software are large firms, are characterised by a
higher share of revenues in products and belong to clusters of innovative
firms.
The two different methodologies put forward to identify software patents
have been fruitfully put together by Hall and MacGarvie (2006). First, they
identified all the US patent class-subclasses combinations where 15 software
firms patent. After that, in order to minimize errors of both first and second
type they merge their database with another one built following the method
of Graham and Mowery (2003) and intersect the resulting database with
the one obtained using Bessen and Hunt (2007) method. Two main results
are worth noticing: (i) the expansion of patentability affected negatively
firms without patents and firms in the downstream sectors mainly because
firms had to ask for licenses to have applications to run on middle-ware and
operating systems; (ii) software patents turn out to be valued more by the
market than ordinary patents. For hardware producers this is likely to reflect
the strategic value of software patents rather than their technological value.
Contrary to that, software patents are found to be technologically valuable
for software firms.
An interest in the study of software patenting in the European patent
system has been increasing during recent years. Difficulties in data collection
and the absence of a clear legislation relative to software patents6 have
constrained the analysis to rely solely on surveys rather than adopting more
general approaches like in the US case.7 Nevertheless, recent attempts
have tried to overcome such a limitation and to implement more general
methodologies.
For example, McQueen (2005) relies on a bibliometric technique to
individuate software patents among more general ones and computes the
distribution of software patents accorded at the EPO in 15 EU countries,
US and Japan for the years 1987, 1990, 1993, 1996 and 1999. He finds that
49% of software patents are assigned to European countries (with Germany
accounting for 50% of the total amount), 18% goes to Japan and 29% to
US. Moreover, an overall increase of 60% of software patent applications is
6Article 52 of the European Patent Convention expressively prohibits software patents,
however the EPO rule of practice has put forward the idea that in case a ‘technical
contribution’ to the prior art is found, then software must be considered as an invention
and, for this reason, susceptible of patenting. To this regard, the situation is not completely
clear and the interpretation of the ‘technical contribution’ is not uniform. In this vacuum
of legislation, although patenting of software and business methods is not permitted by
the EPC, EPO regularly provides a plurality of actors with patents on software; this being
possible given the presence of numerous interpretations on the definition of software.
7Providing a literature background of studies on software patents adopting a survey
approach is beyond the scope of our work. These articles collect data mainly through
the use of questionnaires and interviews. The main drawbacks of such an approach are
that the operation is normally highly time consuming and usually confined to a delimited
geographical area (see Olsson and McQueen (2000) and Blind and Edler (2003)).
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found in the last 12 years. In general, the work by McQueen (2005), despite
path–breaking for the European patent system, presents some drawbacks
that are worth mentioning. First of all, the search on the EPO database is
conducted with a fairly simple keyword search which is likely to maximise
the number of false negatives. Moreover, the database thus constructed is
used only to provide a descriptive analysis of the phenomenon without a
proper test on important research questions linked to the topics put forward
in the US case.
Hall, Thoma, and Torrisi (2007) instead present a more elaborated method
consisting of three main steps. First, they conduct a keyword search on the
EPO data-set using the same algorithm set forward by Bessen and Hunt
(2007) for the US patent system. Second, they analyse the IPC classes of
the patent portfolios of the world’s 15 largest software firms expanding it
in order to give an account of European firms as well. Third, they accept a
restrictive definition of software patent as one falling in the intersection of
the two sets defined by both the keyword and IPC methods. The authors use
the database thus constructed to explore whether software patents in Europe
are valued more than other patents. Results show that software patents,
when only the crude number is taken into consideration, are more valuable
than other patents while, if weighted by their intrinsic quality level, the
difference disappears. Thus, the authors conclude that the value of software
patents in Europe depends more on their number rather than the quality of
the invention they protect.
Although the work by Hall, Thoma, and Torrisi (2007) introduce many
important insights into the topic of software patenting at the EPO, it presents
some limitations that our work aims at bridging. First of all, search methodol-
ogy is surely good but not as accurate as it would be as reading a patents one
by one. In particular, the authors do not provide any kind of comparison of
the database of software patents thus constructed with a trustworthy dataset
containing true software patents. In our paper, we try to overcome such a
shortcoming by comparing our dataset of software patents with a sample of
78 patents containing both software and non-software patents. Second, Hall,
Thoma, and Torrisi (2007) exclude from the analysis non-European firms
and their sample is strongly centered on the UK due to constraints on the
availability of R&D data. On the contrary, we incorporate non-European
companies knowing that, given their better experience in dealing with soft-
ware patents (especially for American firms), foreign companies are likely
to constitute the largest share of companies patenting software at the EPO.
Finally, they are more concerned with the issue of different valuation of
software patents by firms in the European and US patent systems, while
we are more interested in the presence of strategic patenting in the form of
‘threat’ effect by other firms.
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3 The Model
3.1 Theoretical Background
The study on the effect of research and development spending, and other
factors, on the number of patents filed has relied mainly on the Knowledge
Production Function (henceforth KPF) approach. The main idea is that the
R&D expenditure at the firm level can be interpreted as a correct proxy for
the production of knowledge. Then, if we are able to calculate the stock of
knowledge for a certain firm at a fixed point in time, this value is likely to
be a correct proxy for the output of the KPF (Pakes and Griliches, 1984).
In figure 1 we present the classical rational for the KPF approach, aug-
mented of a set of factors which we deem as very important in our analysis8.
The main factors contained in the figure are:
• K represents the dynamics of the stock of knowledge of firm i at time
t;
• ai indicates firm specific factors constant through time. Managerial
ability, opportunities and other similar factors are all examples of the
mentioned variable. Indeed, managerial ability and other firm specific
conditions may have an influence on both the amount of R&D spending
of the firm as well as on the output of the innovation process and hence
on the stock of knowledge produced by the firm;
• R&D represents the amount of R&D expenditure of firm i at time t;
• Pat is the number of patents filed by firm i at time t
• u and U are the error terms for the measurement of R&D expenditure
and patent count respectively;
• Trend is a factor controlling for the presence of specific trend patterns
as time t passes.
So far, the problem remains that what is produced through the R&D
effort of the firm is a rather unobservable quantity, namely technological
knowledge. Hence, a good index of the output of this process is needed. At
this regard, the economic literature has relied on the number of patents filed
by a single firm in a fixed point in time. Even if this index has relevant
drawbacks, among which the fact that not all new innovations are patented
and that patents differ in their economic impact, it has been widely adopted
in applied studies9 (Griliches, 1990).
8In fig. 1 triangles represent unobservable quantities, circles are observable quantities,
while squares are disturbance terms.
9This happened because patent statistics are easily accessible, which is even more true
now after that worldwide patent offices (USPTO, JPO, EPO and WIPO) have computerized
their data and have granted the public access through the web.
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Figure 1: Knowledge Production Function (KPF) Theoretical Model
The present model is quite simple and contributed to the understanding
of the relationship between the amount of R&D spent by the firm and the
output of the innovation activity. Obviously, the amount of R&D cannot
be thought to be a simple amount of spending that is done once per year
and whose value stays constant through time. On the contrary, the R&D
diminishes its own value as time passes, that is it depreciates. For this reason,
the concept of R&D stock is implemented. Moreover, R&D stock is able to
provide a reason why a certain amount of R&D at time t is affected by past
quantities.
Together with the amount of R&D expenditure, other factors contribute to
the understanding of the output of the KPF. These factors are crucial as well.
They have been classified into three main groups: economic, technological
and legal conditions. The first group, economic conditions, is composed
by three main factors:
• Size. Size influences the innovation process of the firm according to four
main reasons. First, large firms benefit from economies of scale and
scope. In this way, they are more competitive than smaller ones (Cohen,
Nelson, and Walsh, 2000). Second, large firms benefit from complemen-
tarities and spillovers coming from other departments. Third, capital
markets are more prone to finance risky innovation projects of larger
8
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firms other than small ones (Peeters and Van Pottelsberghe de la Pot-
terie, 2006). Fourth, large firms are more likely to be endowed with a
legal department which handles IPRs matters (Lerner, 1995).
• Level of competition. Two opposite effects are present in this case.
First, a ‘replacement effect’ according to which firms with a high
market power are less likely to invest in R&D and, as a consequence, to
innovate. The main reason resides in their lack of incentives to spend
more in R&D caused by their dominant position in the market (Arrow,
1962). Second, the ‘efficiency effect’ which states that firms with a
high market power are more likely to innovate because they do not
face any kind of competition for the exploitation of the results of their
innovative activity (Gilbert and Newbery, 1982).
• Strategic factors. These are factors explaining recent trends in patent-
ing strategies at the firm level. In fact, while traditional ‘incentive
theory’ advocated for a long time that the monopoly power, accorded
to the patent holder, acts as an incentive to R&D expenditure10, recent
contributions assert that the high number of patents filed by companies,
in particular larger ones, are instead a strategy aimed at hindering com-
petition and increasing their monopolistic position (Hall and Ziedonis,
2001). This happens mainly in ‘cumulative system’ technologies, that is
technologies where innovation process is highly cumulative. Therefore
the software sector, for the essential cumulativeness of its embedded
technology, is also prone to be threatened by strategic patenting activi-
ties. These factors are of different nature and content. Among them,
it is worth reminding cross- licensing, threat effects, patent ‘thickets’,
and so on.
The second set of factors, i.e. legal conditions, can be proxied by
geographical factors. Indeed, different opportunities may arise from being
located in different regions having different legislations. Among them, four
main macro-areas have been identified: the European Union, the United
States, Japan and other countries11
10An inventor, deprived of the exclusive right to exploit its invention for a definite period
of time, would not had even started the inventive activity was he aware of it. This is
obviously related to the public nature of knowledge (Arrow, 1962).
11While European and American legal regimes have been extensively discussed by the
literature (Graham, Hall, Harhoff, and Mowery, 2002), Japan and other countries are
worth being mentioned. In 1988 Japan has changed its patent system from a single-claim
to a multiple-claim one. This reform has induced two main effects on the Japanese patent
system: (i) a decrease in the number of patent applications, (ii) overlapping patent claims
have been extensively used to defend strategically acquired inventions. This major change
in the Japanese patent system has influenced patenting by both Japanese and American
firms (Sakakibara and Branstetter, 2001). On the contrary, with other countries we indicate
fast growing countries (such as, for instance, India and China) the patent system of which
9
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The third set of factors is constituted by technological opportunities.
These are proxied through the industrial sector of activity of the firm. Indeed,
the effect of formal R&D spending on the innovation output, mediated by
the rate of formation of the stock of knowledge capital, depends on the
sector of activity of the firm (Mansfield, 1986). To our concern, technological
opportunity is of particular interest. In fact, we want to investigate the
different behaviour taken by firms belonging to two separated sectors, namely
hardware and software producers. It has been showed that, during the last
10 years, main patenters at the USPTO are likely to be part of electrical,
computing and instrument industries (Hall, 2004). Moreover, if only software
patents are taken into account firms belonging to electrical, machinery and
instruments account for more than the 60% of software patents accorded
at the USPTO. While software publishers and firms from other software
industries contribute only for the 7% to the overall share of software patents
(Bessen and Hunt, 2007). Hence, if firms not belonging to the software sectors
are more likely to patent software inventions, then it seems reasonable to
suppose that they are doing it for reasons intrinsically different from spurring
innovation spending.
3.2 Method of Estimation
On the grounds of the previous section, the main focus of our analysis will be
now the number of patents a firm applies for. Before continuing and going
into the details of how the database was built up, we would like to spend
some time on the peculiarity of the different estimation methods that have
been implemented.
The main object of the analysis is to explain which factors influence the
number of software patents a firm applies for at the EPO. Hence, our
dependent variable is of a count data type, that is it can assume only positive
integer values. Given this particular feature, together with the fact that
we are facing micro-level data repeating through time, we rely on count-
panel-data models. In particular, we adopt Hausman, Hall, and Griliches
(1984) and Wooldridge (2005) specifications. While the former is usually
advocated as the seminal contribution in these kind of models, the latter
is a straightforward procedure which allows to take into account dynamics
without using GMM estimation of the parameters of interest12.
The most used type of count-panel-data model is the Poisson panel data
model. The estimation of the model can be done via both fixed and random
effects. These are two methods common to linear panel data models but
is not as trustworthy as the one of more developed countries. Indeed, the enforcement of
international regulations concerning IPRs is not always completely pursued in countries
such as China and India (Traphagan, 1998).
12Models implementing Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation to analyze
filed patents in a Count-Panel-Data setting are reviewed by Cameron and Trivedi (1998).
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the procedure differs from the former given its non-linear nature. Indeed,
while in the linear case the fixed effect is cancelled through a first difference
procedure, this is not the case in the non-linear case. Implementing a first
difference will not allow us to cancel out the unobserved heterogeneity term.
Moreover, while in the linear case the estimation proceeds via OLS or GLS,
in the non-linear one maximum likelihood estimation is the correct procedure
to adopt. In particular, to drop out the heterogeneity term, we rely on
conditional maximum likelihood estimation (Andersen, 1970) which allows
the computation of the log-likelihood. The latter, once maximised, yields
both consistent and efficient estimates of the parameter of interest (Hausman,
Hall, and Griliches, 1984).
Contrary to the fixed effect procedure, random effects implies a distribu-
tion of the heterogeneity term as in the linear case. The difference pertains
to the kind of distribution assumed, that in this case is of gamma type rather
than normal13.
Even if very appealing, the Poisson panel data model present three
relevant drawbacks:
1. Conditional mean and conditional variance cannot vary independently.
Formally:
2. The main assumption behind the model is that pi,t ∼ Poisson(µi,t).
This assumption does not hold in the case zero outcome originates from
a separate decision process or when non-linearities in the innovation
process are present. In the first case, problems can arise because firms
prefer a strategy of secrecy. The zero outcome can be due to the fact
that either firms do not patent or firms prefer to keep innovation secret.
In the second case, problems arise because the first innovation is likely
to be more difficult to achieve than the following ones and, for this
reason, the innovation process in non-linear in nature.
3. In case autocorrelation is present, then, it is impossible to introduce
dynamics into the model in order to reduce it. Indeed, in case a lagged
dependent variable is introduced into the model then the method of
estimation, i.e. conditional maximum likelihood, does not provide
consistent estimates of the parameters of interest anymore.
All of the mentioned drawbacks can be overcome through the implemen-
tation of several methodologies:
1. The adoption of a Negative Binomial panel data model, introduced by
Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984), allows conditional variance to
vary with respect to conditional mean. Nevertheless, we run regressions
13For a formal treatment of the two different method of estimation see Cameron and
Trivedi (1998).
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using negative binomial specification and this yield results similar to
the poisson specification. Hence, given the possibility of incorporating
dynamics into the model only through the Poisson specification we
decided to rely on the latter one.
2. The different processes yielding a zero outcome can be tested adopting a
logit panel data model. In this way, we are able to check whether factors
influencing software patenting are robust to different specifications of
the econometric model.
3. Introducing dynamics into the model is done via a particular speci-
fication of the Poisson panel data model introduced by Wooldridge
(2005). There, one lag of the dependent variable is implemented which
considerably lowers the extent of autocorrelation without affecting the
consistency of the estimates.
4 Data
As discussed before, our main aim is to give an account of factors affecting
software patenting by firms applying for patents at the EPO with a particular
eye on strategic patenting. Unfortunately, there are no specific IPC classes
where software patents can be comfortably found, thus it is important to
produce a reliable dataset able to minimise errors both of first and second
type. Type I error refers to the error committed when many false negatives
are detected, that is when a patent that should have included among software
patents is actually excluded. On the contrary, type II error refers to false
positives, that is when a patent that is not related to software is instead
classified as software patent.
Contrary to studies proposed so far that have built up static datasets
according to well-defined methodologies, we rely on a database (i.e. Gauss
database) made available and maintained by a group of practitioners which
is continuously updated and improved thanks to its wiki nature. The first
step of the current section (4.1) is to propose a general description of the
Gauss database, with some relevant statistics concerning European software
patents. Its reliability has been checked by several means, among which
comparing it with another database built via a more standard methodology.
Finally, a descriptive analysis of software patenting in the EU is carried out
relying on Gauss database.
After that, in section 4.2, we investigate the construction of our sample
concerning both European and foreign firms patenting software at the EPO.
In order to do that, we first explain the procedure used to build the sample
concerning firms’ patenting strategies. Then, we check whether the sample
is biased, comparing it with both ANBERD and EUROSTAT population
statistics. Finally, the sample subset of data is presented, underlining certain
12
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characteristics that call for the use of defined econometric techniques and
providing descriptive statistics for the sample itself.
Our last step (see section 4.3) will be to discuss the ratio behind the
adoption of particular variables in our analysis, together with the discussion
of some technical issues concerning the econometric model adopted.
4.1 Gauss Database and Descriptive Statistics
As mentioned, the present analysis of recent trends in software patenting
inside the European Union relies on Gauss database. This database has been
created from different sources. First of all, it comprises a total of 1901 patent
applications filed at EPO with existing equivalent USPTO patents falling
in USPTO patent class 705 which constitute a class devoted exclusively to
business methods and thus more likely to contain software patents as well
(Wagner, 2008). Second, a set of searches of patent documents has been
conducted according to the name of the applicant (mainly software companies)
and about 150 words occurring in software patents. Furthermore, focused
searches in selected ECLA classes with a high probability of containing
software patents have been carried out as well. Finally, the database has
gone public since 1999 and in a wiki form. By doing this, not only the
maintainers of the dataset are able to modify the patents contained therein14,
but also all registered users have been able to keep it up to date and helped
identifying software patents and removing non-software ones.15
In order to check the ability of the database to minimise errors of first
and second type, we relied on two different methods. First of all, we build
a control dataset following the procedure contained in Hall, Thoma, and
Torrisi (2007)16(henceforth HTT database) and provide comparison statistics
for the two datasets (Gauss and HTT database).17. Second, we rely on the
statement by Allison and Lemley (2000) according to which the most reliable
way to individuate software patents is actually to read the description for
every single item and classifying it accordingly (Allison and Lemley, 2000).
Although this statement can be criticized following the argument that patent
drafters sometimes obscure the use of software by making the language in the
application sound like special purpose industrial equipment, we believe that a
person expert in the field will be nevertheless able to identify software patent
from the written description. Indeed, patent drafters have several strong
14Gauss is mainly maintained by an informal group composed of six persons whose
background is rather diversified. Indeed, the group is composed by three financial analysts,
two founders of start-up software companies as well as one physics researcher.
15Collaborative forms of information processing and filtering has shown to be very
effective in recent years, e.g. the Wikipedia project together with other numerous Open
Source programs. Gauss can be thought as a successful experiment aimed at bringing this
form of collaborative organisation to the patent system.
16Refer to section 2 for details on the procedure.
17We are very grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting us such a strategy.
13
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reasons to make clear the real nature of the invention in the description.
First, if they do not do so, they risk finding their own product may not be
covered. In addition, without such clear description, the patent may not
satisfy the inventive step requirement.18
Thus, we constructed a dataset containing 59 software patents and 19
non software patents and checked how the two datasets (Gauss and HTT
database) perform with respect to this benchmark case. In both cases a
consistent robustness of the Gauss database has always been found. As for
the first step, table 1 provide a statistical comparison of Gauss database
and HTT database. In particular, we checked whether the two datasets
differ with respect to any of the following characteristics: distribution by
country of priority, distribution by designated country, distribution by IPC
section/class, annual growth rate of patents published and annual growth
rate of patents filed. Results are quite clear, with the exception of IPC
section/class, no significant difference is found between the two datasets.
Table 1: Comparison of Gauss dataset and controlling sample
Typology of difference test P-value
Country of priority sign test 0.1
Designated countries sign test 1
Unique IPC section/class sign test 0
Annual growth rate by publication year paired t-test 0.66
Annual growth rate by filing year paired t-test 0.6
As for the second point, a set of 78 patents has been built as composition
of two main sources: (i) 23 patents analysed in a study by Bergstra and
Klint (2007), of which 14 are classified as software patents; (ii) 20 software
patents defined as such because they are EU equivalents of software patents
granted by the USPTO (Campbell Kelly and Valduriez, 2005); (iii) 35 patents
analysed by supporters of the FFII who participated to an initiative aimed
at detecting software patents accorded by the EPO. In this way, we have
been able to obtain with a high degree of certainty two distinct groups of
patents: (i) a set of 59 patents classified as true software patents; (ii) a set
of 19 patents which do not protect software technology. The main results
contained in table 2 clearly point to a better performance of Gauss database
compared to the HTT one. Indeed, Gauss is able to detect more than the
70% of software patents contained in the benchmark dataset while HTT
database only identifies 10% of them. As for type I error, HTT database
performs better than Gauss but the difference is minimal (5% vs 10%).
18This line of reasoning has been further validated by some interviews had with Italian
patent attorneys expert in the field. In particular, one of them make the argument quite
clear by stating: “almost 80% of Italian patent attorneys in the field are engineers and, for
this reason, they share a common technical language that can be understood by colleagues
with a certain degree of randomness. Furthermore, providing a vague patent description
14
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Table 2: A comparison of control sample and Gauss in minimising errors of
first and second type
Type II error* Type I error**
HTT 10% 5%
Gauss 73% 10%
n 59 19
* percentage of true software patents detected by the method, ** percentage of patents
detected as software that are not.
The results thus obtained are likely to point out how the method originally
proposed by HTT for the US (Hall and MacGarvie, 2006) and translated
to the European system in order to detect software patents (Hall, Thoma,
and Torrisi, 2007) may regularly fail in recognising software patents. Our
conclusion is that this bias might be partially due to the method proposed
by Bessen and Hunt (2007), which constitutes an important part of the
methodology set forth by Hall, Thoma, and Torrisi (2007), meaning that
it may not be the most efficient one for detecting software patents filed
at the EPO. We provide preliminary evidence of this fact by conducting a
simple qualitative data analysis on titles and abstracts of the 59 patents
classified as true software patents. As expected, ranking words and ad-
hoc phrases contained in the patent abstract and patent title by frequency
of appearance does not return any of the words/frequencies contained in
the search algorithm proposed by Bessen and Hunt (2007). Providing an
explanation of why this is the case it is beyond the scope of the present work
and constitute food for thought of future research avenue. Nevertheless, a
tentative explanation may lie in institutional differences as well as different
ways patent attorneys draft software patents in the two patent systems.
Overall, Gauss database is composed by patents filed between 1978 and
2004. Many information have been extracted from the dataset. In particular,
statistics concerning designated countries, yearly evolution in the number of
filed and granted software patents, country of residence for both inventors
and applicants and patents’ software domain. As it can be seen from fig.
2 the number of software patents filed at the EPO has increased steadily
starting from 1984. During the second half of the 1990s the increase has
been impressive, jumping from 4,500 patents in 1995 to almost 12,000 for
the year 2001. After 2001 the amount of software patents filed dropped
consistently. One of the reasons for this fall can be reconnected to the burst
of the ‘dotcom’ bubble that took place in the period 2000 - 2001. Indeed, the
crisis of many firms making business in the ICT sector could have implied
diminishing patent applications.
From the figure we note that pattern of granted patents follows closely
that of filed ones, nevertheless the gap between the two is increasing. This
may result in a rejection due to the lack of an essential requirement”.
15
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Figure 2: Yearly evolution of filed and lagged granted software patents
(1978-2003)
might be an hint on the increasing strictness of the EPO concerning this
patent typology. A proof of this statement can be inferred also from fig. 3
which graphs, for the top twenty applicants, the number of software patents
granted as a percentage of filed patents. From this, we see that it never
happened that more than the 50% of software patents filed have been granted
at the EPO.
Figure 3: Granted versus non-granted patents for top 20 applicants
16
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Other facts can be desumed thank to figures from 4 to 6. First the
most designated countries, that are countries inside the EU where patent
applicant is asking expressively for protection, are Germany, UK, France,
Italy and The Netherlands. But at the same time other countries, mainly
European Union new entrants, are gaining importance, meaning that either
seeking protection or behaving strategically is an active strategy by software
patents applicants. Second, both applicants and inventors applying for
software patents are mainly from US (respectively 39% and 40%) and Japan
(respectively 25% and 26%) with a minor role played by European Union
inventors and applicants. Germany, which is one of the best performing one,
accounts only for 10% and 9%. This is mainly due to the leading role in
ICT-related products by the US and Japan and from the fact that, at least
for the US, software is susceptible of patenting since the beginning of the
1980s. This has allowed American firms to acquire expertise in both dealing
with application procedures and identifying more valuable inventions to be
patented.
Figure 4: Country of residence for top 20 applicants
If we focus our attention on software patent concentration, then a highly
concentrated pattern is discovered. According to fig. 7 the top 50 applicants
account for more than the 50% of patents accorded at the EPO.
Taking a look to a subset of the database in the period between 1995 and
17
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Figure 5: Country of residence for top 20 inventors
2003 provides useful insights on the recent dynamics in software patenting
in the EU. Data shows an increasing number of filed patents which are not
granted or not yet granted: while about 60% of patents filed in 1995 switched
to the granted state before the end of 2003, 83% of patents filed in 2000 have
not been granted yet. This justifies the low share of granted patents included
in the mentioned subset, and it is connected to an increase in the time required
to complete the granting process, whose average length is of 3,5 years: while
granted patents in 1997 had been filed about 1 year earlier, those granted
in 2003 took, as an average, more than 5 years to complete the granting
procedure. It must be mentioned that getting closer to 2003 the database
updating procedure has a relevance in justifying a lower share of granted
patents. It is possible to point out, anyway, that in the period 1995-2003 a
lower number of patents had been granted against a fast increasing number
of filed requests, and in general the granting procedure slowed. This finding
can be explained by different means. First, the productivity of the EPO is
decreasing. This is mainly due to two main reasons: the growing number of
patents filed in general and an additional weight constituted by international
patent applications. The former factor is due to the rising importance of
patents among other IPRs. All patent offices around the world are facing a
huge number of patent applications. These are not counterbalanced by an
adequate investment in internal personnel. This means that the number of
18
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Figure 6: Top 20 designated countries
patents per employee is steadily increasing, leading the granting procedure
to slow down. At the same time, EPO has been selected as the more efficient
patent office around. This has leaded international patent applications to be
redirected there, given the higher quality assured in the granting procedure.
This fact has additionally increased the already huge number of patent
applications to be processed.
All of these reasons can not fully explain the high difference in the average
grant of the granting procedure between patents in general and software
patents, i.e. 3,5 years against 5 years. The cause for this difference must be
found in other factors such as the complexity of the patenting matter and
the absence of clarity concerning decision procedures. Moreover, the lack
of a well defined prior art contributes to the uncertainty surrounding the
granting procedure.
4.2 Sample Construction and Description
In order to investigate the determinants of software patenting at the firm
level, a link has been established between a subset of Gauss database19 and
a set of other databases. In particular, we followed a three stage procedure.
First of all, we matched firm’s name from the ‘2004 EU Industrial Research
19The subset of data refers to the information collected for the period 2000-2003.
19
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Figure 7: Cumulative percentage of software patent applications by top 50
applicants
Investment Scoreboard’20(henceforth R&D scoreboard) with patent assignee
name from Gauss.21 After that, we re-matched the two database through
the name of subsidiaries and we assigned the number of patents filed to
the relative parent company. From these first two steps we obtained a new
sample comprising firms contained in the R&D scoreboard with the relative
number of patents they have applied for in the period 2000-2003, defining it
R&D-Gauss. Finally, we matched R&D-Gauss with both Amadeus and Osiris
consolidated data by firm’s name in order to retrieve additional information
for our analysis (see fig. 8).22
20This is produced as a part of the ‘Investing in research: an Action Plan for Europe
COM(2003)226 - EC DG Joint Research Centre’ and lists the R&D spending together
with other relevant information, of the top 500 EU and top 500 Non-EU corporate R&D
investors for the period 2000-2003.
21In order to establish proper linking relations, a semi-automatic data process to match
companies to applicants has been performed. A specific small software application has been
developed performing automatic matching between firms’ values and requiring explicit
operator’s confirmation only in cases in which applicants were not univocally identified.
This procedure has been coupled with a time consuming manual processing of the data in
order to strongly increase the reliability of the sample.
22Amadeus business directory contains account data of European companies and their
subsidiaries located in the EU, together with subsidiaries of non-EU companies, while
Osiris business directory contains contains account data of Non EU companies with their
subsidiaries together with subsidiaries of EU companies located in non EU countries. These
sources also provide information concerning the ownership status, affiliates and subsidiaries,
20
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Figure 8: Database construction procedure
A resulting dataset obtained by linking the information available in the
mentioned sources is composed by 979 firms whose data concerning Research
and Development spending, sector and geographic classification, number of
software patents filed are available for the period 2000-2003.
In order to check the representability of our sample we performed two
main comparisons:
1. ANBERD database vs R&D-Gauss. In this first phase we compared the
representability of our dataset with data from ANBERD. The latter is a
comprehensive database containing information on the R&D spending
in 21 OECD countries. Our database is found to perform very well
with respect to this. Indeed, it accounts for the 73% of R&D conducted
by countries contained in it. Moreover, whether the comparison is done
at the sector level, the R&D database accounts for the 71,35% of R&D
performed23.
useful to consolidate the data at the level of the ultimate parent company.
23In this second case the comparison is not as reliable as in the previous one. This is
mainly due to the different sector classification characterizing the analysed datasets. Indeed,
while OECD data follow NACE industrial classification R&D scoreboard are organised
through Financial Times and London Stock Exchange (FTSE) one. In order to compare
the two data sources we have built a NACE-FTSE table of comparison, nevertheless this
is far from being totally satisfactory.
21
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2. EUROSTAT vs R&D-Gauss. While from the R&D spending point
of view we are pretty sure that the sample taken into consideration
is representative, when the number of enterprises is analysed this
might not be correct anymore. So, for the sake of comparison, we
decided to rely on European statistics retrieved from EUROSTAT24.
The comparison between our database and data on firm’s population
displays the low representability of our sample. Nevertheless, it has
been possible to conduct the comparison only with respect to few
countries given the mismatch between our sample (comprising firms
from several countries around the world) and population statistics
from EUROSTAT (comprising only a limited number of European
countries).
From the previous analysis we can conclude that our sample is not
representative for the whole population of companies at the EPO, but that it
gives a clear and reliable picture of the R&D spending and of other relevant
variables. We interpreted this fact as the ability of our sample to describe
correctly the behaviour and characteristics of large firms applying for software
patents at the EPO25.
Once checked for the reliability of our sample, we can now shift to provide
a general description of the dataset. Table 4 presents the distribution of
companies by industry showing that IT hardware, electronic &electrical and
software & computer services are those sectors where software patents are
mainly present. Furthermore, companies patenting software at the EPO are
found to be mainly US and Japanese companies (see table 5). Tables 3 and
4 also reveal a clear pattern of the sample, that is there is a high number of
firms not applying for any patent. Indeed, only 406 companies out of 979
do applied for at least one software patent in the period 2000-03. Thus, the
structure of the dataset calls for the implementation of a sound econometric
model able to take into account data’s specific pattern. At this respect,
the choice made of adopting count data models is supported from both the
nature of the depending variable and the structure of the data. Moreover
plotting the number of filed patents against R&D spending, highlights the
better fit reached by a Poisson distribution with respect to a linear one (the
smoother line in figures 9 fits better to the data meaning that an exponential
specification performs better).
24We also checked for the presence of statistics on firm population at the OECD level,
but our attempt has been disappointing because of the presence of a high quantity of
missing values.
25We have not been able to implement a post-stratification procedure to correct for
existing biases. This is due to the unavailability of OECD data for the years of interest. In
particular numerous missing values jeopardize the possibility of drawing statistics for the
population of interest, whose contribution to the construction of appropriate weights for
the post-stratification procedure is essential. For a more comprehensive discussion on the
representability of R&D scoreboard for large companies see Frietsch (2004).
22
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics
N Mean Median Standard
Deviation
Min Max
Stock
of R&D
expendi-
tures
3560 14.85 4 35.49 0.02 333.84
Sales 3824 8225.15 2071.44 18849.06 0.7 212971.5
Employees 3849 27204.84 8316 51063.54 1 477100
Stock
of filed
software
patents
3916 46.28 0 222.24 0 2285
Stock of
granted
software
patents
3916 8.62 0 47.74 0 727.83
Index of
sectoral
concentra-
tion
3916 0.32 0.26 0.13 0.21 1
Strategic
patenting
2937 4596.14 1922.25 5789.02 0 17835
23
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Table 4: Distribution of companies by industry
with R&D with software patent
FTSE sector
Aerospace & defence (21) 25 15
Automobiles & parts (31) 60 27
Banks (81) 1 0
Beverages (41) 4 0
Chemicals (11) 78 32
Construction & building (13) 21 9
Diversified industrials (24) 17 7
Electricity (72) 17 4
Electronic & electrical (25) 72 43
Engineering & machinery (26) 91 38
Food & drug retailers (63) 2 0
Food producers (43) 22 3
Forestry & paper (15) 7 0
General retailers (52) 7 1
Health (44) 38 9
Household goods & textiles (34) 29 10
IT hardware (93) 138 95
Leisure & hotels (53) 3 0
Media & entertainment (54) 17 7
Mining (04) 5 0
Oil & gas (07) 19 7
Personal care & household (47) 14 5
Pharma & biotech (48) 126 28
Software & computer services (97) 94 41
Speciality & other finance (87) 3 0
Steel & other metals (18) 15 6
Support services (58) 17 6
Telecommunication services (67) 22 12
Tobacco (49) 4 0
Transport (59) 3 0
Utilities - other (73, 78) 8 1
Total 979 406
24
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Table 5: Distribution of companies by country
with R&D with software patent
Country
Australia 2 2
Austria 10 1
Belgium 16 1
Canada 7 6
Denmark 28 4
Finland 28 7
France 66 26
Germany 100 37
Greece 2 1
Hungary 2 0
Ireland 4 1
Italy 17 6
Japan 153 97
Luxembourg 2 0
Norway 3 1
South Korea 9 3
Spain 9 1
Sweden 44 12
Switzerland 18 8
The Netherlands 22 6
UK 149 36
USA 288 150
Total 979 406
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Figure 9: Plots of filed patents against R&D stock, 2000-03
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4.3 Variables
In this section we will proceed to describe the variables implemented during
the econometric estimation. A more systematic and clear-cut definition of
variables is presented in table 6 as well. Dependent variables change according
to the type of model adopted. In particular, the dependent variable is of
a numeric type when either the poisson or negative binomial model are
implemented26 On the contrary, dependent variable is dichotomous when a
logit panel data model is investigated. This is due to the main goal of our
analysis in this case, that is whether the firm is applying for patents or not27
On the other side, independent variables can be divided into two main
groups: structural and control variables. Structural variables include all
those variables that are object of the analysis throughout different specifica-
tions. These variables are:
1. R&D spending (R&Di,t). This is the amount of the R&D spending
performed by firm i at time t. The amount has been transformed in
purchasing power parity dollars (PPP$) to allow comparability among
different countries and it has been expressed as a stock (see table 6 and
Griliches and Mairesse (1981)). According to our theoretical model
this should be a very important variable directly related to the stock of
software patents filed at the EPO. At this regard, it can be reasonably
asserted that not only the contemporaneous level of R&D spending
should be used in the analysis, but also its whole lag structure should
be taken into account. Indeed, the nature of R&D as a long term
investment in knowledge capital, whose results are likely to be achieved
at any time and not only in the year of the investment, seems to be a
reasonable assumption. Nevertheless, the empirical literature on this
topic has shown that the estimated coefficient for the sum of past R&D
spending is roughly equal to the estimated coefficient for the level of
contemporaneous R&D (Hall, Griliches, and Hausman, 1986; Montalvo,
1997).
2. Sales (Salesi,t). This is the amount of sales achieved by firm i in year
t. The same transformations as for R&D spending has been performed.
3. Employees (Empli,t). The number of employees for firm i at time
t. This variable proxies for firm size and it influences the number of
software patents filed. In fact, larger firms are likely to have more
resources in order to apply for more patents. This is even more likely
26This happens because, in this last case, we are interested in the number of patents
filed by the single firm in a given year. At this regard, the variable is computed as the
stock of filed patents a firm files in the present year.
27This is why the variable is taking only two values: value one in case firm files a software
patent, zero otherwise.
27
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to happen in the EU where the average cost of a patent is higher than
in other patent systems (Malerba and Montobbio, 2002).
4. Sector concentration (Secj). This has been computed as the total sales
of the four largest firms in terms of sales in firm’s i main sector of
activity (indicated by j) divided by the overall amount of sales of the
same sector28.
5. Strategic rivalry (Strati,t). This is the stock of software patents filed
by firms belonging to the same sector of firm i in year t − 1. This
variable proxies for the influence of strategic factors on the software
patenting of firms in the sample. Indeed, most of the time firms apply
for software patents only because this is a way to strategically hinder
their competitors. Patenting inventions is a way to reduce the value of
other firms’ innovation and to decrease their average return to R&D
while affecting own market value (Noel and Schankerman, 2006).
6. Stock of software patents filed in the previous year (Patt−1). This is
the stock of software patents filed by firm i in year t− 1. This variable
takes into account the effect on software patenting decision by the
number of software patents filed in the former year.
Control variables are all those variables that are implemented in order
to control for factors which are essentially specific to the particular context
where analysis is conducted. These variables are:
1. Year dummy (Y eart). These are a set of four dummy variables
29 which
take into account the effect of external outcomes to the knowledge
production function. In particular, it gives a hint on the institutional
context where the firm is operating and on the different happenings
taking place.
2. Geographical proxy (Countryi). We use these variables to disentangle
the effects produced by different patent systems a firm has been dealing
with30. A firm that is used to operate inside the US have a deep knowl-
edge concerning both the intrinsic and strategic value an invention is
likely to produce once patented. On the contrary, the blurred situation
characterising the European patent system should be interpreted like a
hindering mechanism.
28This has been done following the FTSE sector classification. By definition, this is
based on firms operating in the same sector and it does not always reflect the impact of
direct competition. Unfortunately, this is the best approximation we have been able to
make according to available data.
29In particular, years from 2000 to 2003 are taken into consideration.
30In line with the theoretical considerations of section 3.1, we analyse fourth main
categories: American, European, Japanese and ‘remaining’ patent system.
28
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3. Sectoral/Technological proxy (Techi). These dummy variables proxy
the technological opportunities arising from the seven sectors of activity
a firm can belong to.
29
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Table 6: Variables definition
Variable Name in
the re-
gression
table
Description
Stock of R&D
spending
R&D Stock of R&D expenditures expressed in
millions of PPP$. The Stock has been
computed following Griliches and Mairesse
(1981) and assuming a pre-sample growth
rate of 1% and a depreciation rate of 15%
Number of em-
ployees
Empl Number of employees
Sales Sales Sales expressed in millions of PPP$
Stock of software
patents in previ-
ous year
Pat 1 Stock of software patents filed in the pre-
vious year rounded to the closest integer
number. The Stock has been computed fol-
lowing Griliches and Mairesse (1981) and
assuming a pre-sample growth rate of 5%
and a depreciation rate of 15%
Stock of software
patents in current
year
Pat Stock of software patents filed in the
present year rounded to the closest integer
number. The Stock has been computed fol-
lowing Griliches and Mairesse (1981) and
assuming a pre-sample growth rate of 5%
and a depreciation rate of 15%
Sector concentra-
tion ratio
Sector conc Sector concentration ratio relative to the
FTSE sector the firm belongs to. It is com-
puted as the ratio between the sales of the
four largest firms by FTSE economic group
over the total sales in the same FTSE eco-
nomic group
Strategic patent-
ing
Strategic Stock of software patents filed in the previ-
ous year by other firms in the same FTSE
sector as the observed company
Year dummies Dyear* Variable assuming value 1 in one particular
year (ranging between 2000 and 2003) and
0 otherwise
Sectoral dummies DS* Variable assuming value 1 if the firm be-
longs to one particular FTSE sector and 0
otherwise
Country dummies DC* Variable assuming value 1 if the firm is
located in one particular area (US, Japan
and the EU) and 0 otherwise
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5 Results
Results from the econometric exercise are presented in tables ranging from
7 to 9. All of these show Poisson panel data models in the specification as
conceived by Wooldridge (2005). In all of these specifications, dependent
variable is computed as the stock of filed software patents (see table 6 for
details on variable construction).31
In table 7 we report the results for the Poisson panel data model estimation
for the whole sample adopting both fixed and random effects. Random effects
models are of three different typologies in our specification. The typology
varies according to the set of control variables that are introduced, i.e. year
dummy, geographical dummy and technological dummy. Results show that
the stock of software patents applied for in the previous year is always
significant but its value is negligible. The amount of sales is the only other
variable always significant. In the random effects case the variable proxying
for strategic factors affecting software patenting is significant and positive
for all of the three specifications. Among the control variables, the most
striking fact is the significance and high value for almost all the sectors taken
into consideration. Among the others, being part of electronics, hardware,
media and software sectors explains the likelihood to patent software at the
EPO. After the estimation, we checked for the best specification through the
implementation of the Hausman test (Hausman, 1978). According to the
result, fixed effects must be preferred because they provide both consistent
and efficient estimators of the parameters of interest. While in the former
case the random effects are rejected by the Hausman test, when we proceed
to an analysis at the single sector level the Hausman test is not able to
give us proper information on the issue. Indeed, this points to the fact that
implementing random effects, that is allowing for the presence of unobserved
permanent differences across firms, yields reliable estimates of the parameters
of interest (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). There are important information to be
drawn from variables which vary among firms but that are constant through
time, i.e. geographical and technological proxies. Relying exclusively on
the fixed effect specification will sweep them out. In this way, we will not
be able to take into account their effect on the estimation procedure. For
all of the above mentioned reasons, we decided to concentrate our analysis
respectively on the software and hardware sector relying mainly on random
effects estimates (see tables 8 and 9).
In table 8, R&D spending is not significantly related to the number of
software patents a firm applies for. This result is likely to confirm the fact that
patent is not considered a useful appropriability instrument for the results of
31We also controlled for patent quality by running alternative regressions with the stock
of granted software patents as dependent variable. Results in this case are in line with
those presented here, that is size and significance of coefficients are basically unaltered.
We are grateful to a referee for pointing this out.
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R&D process, mostly in technologies characterised by cumulativeness in the
innovation process. This is a result obtained for the EU at the general level
— i.e. concerning patents in general (Arundel, 2001)— but no evidence was
provided for software patents. To us, the absence of a significant relationship
between the two variables supports our belief that R&D contributes to the
creation of knowledge capital and innovation but that software patents do
not proxy well the innovation output, meaning that it is not deemed as a
suitable appropriability measure. Obviously, this result is in contrast with
the common belief that patents are useful appropriability measures for the
result of inventive activity (Arrow, 1962; Scotchmer, 1991), but in line with
recent progress of the economic literature pointing to the existence of a mix
of reasons explaining the upsurge in the number of patent applications, i.e.
strategic factors (Shapiro, 2001; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Hall, 2004).
On the other side, the number of employees seems to play an important
role for software patenting at the firm level, underlying the importance of the
presence of a legal department handling IPRs (Lerner, 1995). This points to
the presence of economies of scale in generating software patents. Indeed,
larger firms can exploit patents better thanks to the rich endowment of
financial resources devoted to IPRs managing departments.
Finally, the variable proxying the role of strategic factors is never sig-
nificant for firms belonging to the software sector. This fact sheds light on
both the economic and technological nature of the inventive process typical
of high–tech industries. In particular, the software sector has been found
to be characterised by a technology which is cumulative, sequential, path–
dependent and where strong interdependencies among pieces of knowledge
are present (Marengo and Pasquali, 2006). For all of these reasons, firms
producing software does not deem patent protection as a useful mechanism
spurring future inventive streams. On the contrary, it is common belief
among practitioners that software patents are likely to hinder the rate of
innovation ant to lock-in the market in favor of few monopolistic firms (Blind
and Edler, 2003; Ghosh, 2007)
Results for the IT hardware sector are presented in table 9. R&D spending
is not significant as in the software case while firm size is significant, even
if the coefficient is lower than in the software case. On the contrary, the
variable proxying for strategic factors contributes consistently to explain the
number of software patents applied for. We interpret this result as a clue on
the pressure put on firm patenting strategies by rivals belonging to the same
sector. This is likely to point to the presence of a ‘threat effect’, that is a
strategic interest of hardware firms to patent software for reasons other than
the increase in its own inventive capacity. Indeed, the coefficient proxying for
the number of software patents filed in the previous year by firms other than
the firm under consideration (variable strategic) is significant and positive.
We interpret this result as a sign of the presence of strong strategic factors
inside the hardware sector. Firms in this sector are not likely to patent
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software to appropriate results of the R&D process; but, at the same time,
they are eager to patenting if they fear intra-industry competition. This
‘threat effect’ is due to the nature of the software technology that is of a
cumulative type. An increase in the amount of software patents accorded
to neighbor firms can hinder future development of both hardware and
embedded software, in this way leading the company to apply for patents as
a defensive strategy.
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Table 7: Poisson panel data estimation: Fixed and Random Effects
Variables FE RE (1) RE (2) RE (3)
Pat 1 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R&D -0.115* 0.109** 0.027 -0.056
(0.046) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039)
Sales 0.074*** 0.068*** 0.077*** 0.080***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Empl -0.052 0.167*** 0.093** 0.015
(0.043) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036)
Strategic 0.072 0.182*** 0.186*** 0.081*
(0.039) (0.032) (0.032) (0.036)
Sector conc 0.009 0.204** 0.076 0.035
(0.068) (0.076) (0.066) (0.066)
Dyear02 -0.007
(0.010)
Dyear03 -0.058***
(0.011)
DCeu 0.606
(0.608)
DCusa 0.348
(0.605)
DCjapan 0.820
(0.636)
DSelectr 1.945***
(0.459)
DSeng -0.446
(0.394)
DShard 1.695***
(0.365)
DSmedia 1.605*
(0.813)
DSsoft 1.197**
(0.394)
DStel 1.058
(0.794)
cons 0.885* 0.580 1.586***
(0.370) (0.737) (0.367)
χ2 970.382 1102.615 1069.587 1116.493
N 1102.000 2504.000 2504.000 2504.000
Log-likelihood -1705.271 -4284.131 -4305.951 -4286.582
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Standard errors are in parentheses. The
specification of the model relies on Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984), Hall and Ziedonis
(2001) and Wooldridge (2005).
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Table 8: Poisson panel data estimation for the software sector: Fixed and
Random Effects.
Variables FE RE (1) RE (2) RE (3)
Pat 1 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
R&D 0.558 0.201 0.379 0.669
(0.435) (0.224) (0.261) (0.293)
Sales 0.109 0.161* 0.102 0.095
(0.084) (0.065) (0.078) (0.070)
Empl 0.677* 0.393* 0.483* 0.785**
(0.364) (0.183) (0.196) (0.241)
Sector conc 0.353 -1.591 -1.208
(1.888) (1.877) (1.881)
Strategic -0.111 -2.057 -6.818 -1.490
(1.685) (1.658) (3.888) (1.675)
Dyear01 1.242
(0.783)
Dyear02 0.577
(0.368)
DCeu 1.201
(2.317)
DCusa -1.290
(2.268)
cons 16.562 58.887 9.588
(11.901) (33.041) (12.591)
χ2 264.908 279.787 281.625 292.000
N 117.000 265.000 265.000 265.000
Log-likelihood -234.368 -519.572 -518.665 -516.397
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Standard errors are in parentheses. The
specification of the model relies on Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984), Hall and Ziedonis
(2001) and Wooldridge (2005).
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Table 9: Poisson panel data estimation for the hardware sector: Fixed and
Random Effects.
Variables FE RE (1) RE (2) RE (3)
Pat 1 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R&D 0.001 0.073 0.068 0.085
(0.066) (0.058) (0.058) (0.060)
Sales 0.088** 0.091*** 0.085** 0.090**
(0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027)
Empl 0.082 0.159** 0.148** 0.169**
(0.060) (0.051) (0.052) (0.054)
Sector conc 0.542 0.478 0.474
(0.295) (0.295) (0.295)
Strategic 1.314** 1.209** 6.966* 1.217**
(0.422) (0.422) (4.224) (0.422)
Dyear02 0.311
(0.192)
Dyear03 0.776
(0.507)
DCeu 0.024
(1.270)
DCusa -0.639
(1.225)
DCjapan -0.102
(1.364)
cons -8.281* -65.164 -8.094*
(3.769) (41.256) (3.969)
χ2 323.424 347.134 348.777 349.945
N 264.000 395.000 395.000 395.000
Log-likelihood -474.096 -1112.417 -1111.478 -1111.286
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Standard errors are in parentheses. The
specification of the model relies on Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984), Hall and Ziedonis
(2001) and Wooldridge (2005).
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6 Discussion and Conclusion
The main goal of this article has been to provide a deep account of software
patenting in the EU. Although this has been a relevant and well regulated
phenomenon since the 1980s in the US, the EU lagged behind for some
time. Nevertheless, in the last decade the number of software patents filed
at the EPO has grown rapidly despite article 52 of the European Patent
Convention expressively prohibits software patenting. To investigate the
topic, we present a new database containing information on software patents,
i.e. Gauss database. The database has undergone an extensive check in order
to prove its reliability, not only it performs well compared to alternative
datasets built according to alternative procedures (e.g. the HTT dataset and
a benchmark dataset containing 78 patents), but also its wiki nature suggests
that it will improve even more in the near future thanks to the contribution
of several experts. These data show how software patents are an important
phenomenon in the EU as well given that more than 30,000 software patents
have been granted to both European and foreign firms till nowadays. In this
respect, a large part of them has been accorded to American and Japanese
firms. The fact that nearly the majority of granted patents belongs to foreign
companies must be due to the higher experience that these firms have acquired
dealing with their own patent system. For example, software is patentable
since a long time in the US meaning that firms have more expertise in dealing
with application procedures and in identifying more valuable inventions to
be patented. Together with this finding other interesting statistics have been
presented. Among the others, we have found that for software patents the
average length of the granting procedure is larger than for more general
patents. Moreover, we have discovered that particular industries apply for
the majority of software patents, i.e. electronics and IT hardware. Despite
the increasing number of applications, the granting procedure of software
patents has been characterised by an increasing strictness in recent years.
Finally, the ownership of software patents is highly concentrated and both
inventors and applicants come respectively from US and Japan. Then, the
knowledge production function approach has been implemented in order to
identify the major factors affecting the output of the innovation process at
the firm level. The model has been extended to incorporate factors deemed
as very important to explain recent patenting strategies, i.e. strategic factors,
firm size, technological and geographical opportunities, and to deal with
our specific interests, i.e. the idiosyncrasies of both software and hardware
sector. Both the way in which the dataset has been built and a robustness
check for the database itself have been presented. Moreover a set of different
methods of estimation have been put forward and the most suitable one has
been chosen. After that, the results of the chosen econometric model have
been presented. The main outcome of the analysis deals with the strategic
behaviour by firms belonging to the hardware sector, that file software patents
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mainly as a ‘threat effect’ against competitors.
We are aware of limitations to the present work. First of all, the EU
Scoreboard, on which we rely to link firms’ characteristics with the number
of software patents filed, allows us to take into consideration the behaviour of
large firms only. Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) together with their
software patenting strategies are totally disregarded. Obviously, providing a
proper representation of SMEs at the European level is a very difficult task,
due to the shortage of reliable data concerning both innovation strategies
and patents at the firm level. Such a limitation will be overcome once more
trustworthy datasets on these issues will be available. Second, there has not
been the possibility to separate R&D expenditure used in software production
from the one used for other purposes. In order to overcome such a limitation,
we refined our analysis in two particular sectors of activity, i.e. software and
hardware. Indeed, firms belonging to these sectors devote a large share of
their R&D spending to the production of software. This means that almost
all of the investment in R&D drives to software patenting and not to patent
another type of technology. Third, the method of estimation that has been
adopted relies heavily on a set of general assumptions. Among the others,
the assumption of strict exogeneity is the most controversial one32. In our
specific case, this condition implies that patents cannot depend on additional
R&D expenditures to be fully appropriate or improved. Obviously, this
statement is contrary to the common practice. In the reality, most of the firms
make additional investments either to improve or to fully commercialize an
invention protected by patent. Nevertheless, the fact that R&D expenditure
cannot be considered completely as strictly exogenous does not invalidate
the analysis carried out along this work. Indeed, most of the empirical
contributions so far has mainly relied on these method of estimations. Only
recent works have tried to overcome above mentioned limitations and they
have not reached viable solutions yet (Montalvo, 1997; Blundell, Griffith,
and Windmeijer, 2002). In particular, the adoption of GMM procedures is
rather computationally intensive, meaning that a large amount of data is
needed both at the individual level and through time. Thus, in our case the
trade-off between data constraints and estimation efficiency has been resolved
relying on more trustworthy estimation procedures. Finally, we provide the
estimation on a narrow time window only, that is 2000-2003. This is mainly
due to the lack of data concerning R&D for a long time frame for companies
located in the EU, which is a common problem in studies of this kind.33
32According to this, the error term is not correlated at all with future, past and present
values of the explanatory variables. In case the assumption does not hold, then the
consistency of the estimators fails to be achieved.
33Unlikely in the US, where data on R&D are revealed by companies due mainly to fiscal
reasons, European companies are less likely to do that given the absence of such a provision.
Some European companies located in the EU are nevertheless disclosing this information
and Hall et al. (2007) make use of this data and couple them with other data sources to
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A second point refers to the difficult task of matching company data with
names of patent applicants. Although automatic matching techniques exist,
they are still far from being fully reliable and, for this reason, a manual check
is often preferred. In our case, manual check comprised 3 datasets (Amadeus
and Osiris for account data, EPO access and EPO bulletin databases for filed
and granted patents at the EPO and the EU R&D investment scoreboard for
company level data) thus meaning an extensive and long work in processing
the data manually. We are aware of the fact that a longer time period would
allow us to better investigate the robustness of our results but we faced a
trade-off between the construction of a reliable dataset for a 4-years long
time period and setting-up a dataset covering a longer time frame at the
expense of trustworthiness.
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